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Family Law. In re Rylee A., 233 A.3d 1040 (R.I. 2020). The
Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviews termination of parental
rights by examining the record to establish whether the Family
Court justice’s findings are supported by legal and competent
evidence. The Court declined to disturb the Family Court’s ruling
to terminate the respondents’ parental rights to their daughter
because legally competent evidence existed to support the findings
of the Family Court justice by clear and convincing evidence.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

The respondents, Krystal A. (Krystal) and Shane A. (Shane),
are the biological parents of Rylee A. (Rylee) who was born on
October 28, 2016.1 During Rylee’s first forty days of life she
suffered horrific physical abuse inflicted upon her by the
respondents, her own parents.2 On December 7, 2016, Rylee was
taken to Kent Hospital and later transferred by ambulance to
Hasbro Children’s Hospital with a fractured femur.3 Rylee’s
treating physician, Adebimpe Adewusi, M.D., under the
supervision of Brett Slingsby, M.D., filed a Physician’s Report of
Examination requesting that Rylee be placed in state custody after
Rylee’s medical examination revealed signs of suspected child
abuse.4
The hospital then placed a seventy-two-hour hold on Rylee and
alerted the state Department of Children, Youth, and Families

1. In re Rylee A., 233 A.3d 1040, 1043 (R.I. 2020). The respondents’ appeals were consolidated per court order on May 17, 2019. Id. at n.1. The respondents are referenced to by their first names for the sake of privacy or collectively as “respondents” as the Rhode Island Supreme Court did in its
opinion. See id. at n.2.
2. Id. Rylee suffered a fractured right femur; posterior fractures to three
of her ribs; bruising on the palm and fingers of her right hand, left flank, left
shin, left thigh, and left forearm; and scratches on her right cheek. Id. Each
injury was examined and diagnosed by medical child abuse experts. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
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(DCYF) of the suspected child abuse.5 Two days later, DCYF filed
a “neglect and abuse petition” in the Family Court in accordance
with Rhode Island General Laws section 40-11-7.6 A no-contact
order that prevented respondents from having any contact with
Rylee was put in place.7 DCYF then filed a second petition in
Family Court to “involuntarily terminate the parental rights of the
respondents in accordance with Rhode Island General Laws section
15-7-7(a)(2)(ii).”8 The petitions were merged and proceeded to trial
on September 7, 2017; the trial concluded in December of 2017.9
During trial, various medical professionals and DCYF workers
testified.10 First, Dr. Slingsby, an “expert in the area of general
pediatrics and child abuse pediatrics,” testified that he was the
supervisor of Dr. Adewusi who conducted a full medical
examination of Rylee and prepared the initial medical report.11 Dr.
Slingsby testified that he and Dr. Adewusi discussed Rylee’s
condition and medical records and that he gave signed approval of
the report Dr. Adewusi prepared.12 Dr. Slingsby also testified that
on the following day he examined Rylee himself and observed
various “patterned” injuries that he concluded were “generally

5. Id.
6. Id. “Both parents [were] convicted of cruelty or neglect in the Family
Court in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-9-5.” Id. at n.3.
7. Id.
8. Id. Rhode Island General Laws section 15-6-7(a)(2)(ii), titled Termination of parental rights, states in relevant part:
(a) The court shall, upon a petition duly filed by a governmental child
placement agency or licensed child placement agency after notice to
the parent and hearing on the petition, terminate any and all legal
rights of the parent to the child, including the right to notice of any
subsequent adoption proceedings involving the child, if the court finds
as a fact by clear and convincing evidence that:
....
(2) The parent is unfit by reason of conduct or conditions seriously
detrimental to the child, such as, but not limited to, the following:
....
(ii) Conduct toward any child of a cruel or abusive nature.
15 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-6-7(a)(2)(ii) (1956).
9. In re Rylee A., 233 A.3d at 1043–44.
10. Dr. Adewusi no longer worked at Hasbro at the time of the hearing,
had moved out of state, and did not testify at the trial. Id. at 1044 n.5.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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caused by an object and [were] ‘not something we see from falls or
babies bumping into things.’”13 Dr. Slingsby further testified that,
on December 21, he and Dr. Adewusi “conducted a follow-up
skeletal survey of Rylee, which revealed posterior rib fractures to
three of Rylee’s ribs.”14 Dr. Slingsby noted that the most common
cause of posterior rib fractures is compression or squeezing of the
rib cage.15 Lastly, Dr. Slingsby “concluded, to a reasonable degree
of medical certainty, that the bruises and fracturs of Rylee’s
posterior ribs and femur were inflicted by physical child abuse.”16
Next, Joshua Cottle, a child protective investigator assigned to
Rylee’s case, testified that a DCYF history check revealed that
Shane had been flagged as a convicted sex offender and
perpetrator.17 During the investigation, Cottle had interviewed the
respondents separately.18 According to Cottle, Krystal was “very
emotional during the interview” and stated that “Shane, her
husband, did not live at home and that she was Rylee’s sole
caretaker.”19 Next, Cottle interviewed Shane who repeated most of
what Krystal said and added that he did not stay overnight at
Krystal’s residence.20
Officer Samuel Maldonado, who was assigned to investigate
Rylee’s case, testified that he interviewed the respondents at the
police station.21 Officer Maldonado testified that during the
interview Krystal admitted that Shane would stay at her house
overnight while Shane stated he would always leave the home at
night.22 Further, Officer Maldonado testified that Krystal stated
she did not know how Rylee’s injuries occurred but did offer possible

13. Id. Dr. Slingsby further testified that such an injury could not have
occurred by a child jumping on Rylee’s leg or by an adult rolling onto Rylee
while sleeping. Id.
14. Id. Dr. Slingsby noted that an injury like this had occurred at least
seven days prior to the survey. Id.
15. Id. at 1045.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1046.
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explanations.23 One explanation was that another child, Maddison,
who had been jumping on the bed where Rylee slept, may have
fallen on her.24 Officer Maldonado testified that, when he spoke
with Dr. Adewusi, the doctor told him none of Krystal’s
explanations were plausible.25 Finally, Officer Maldonado testified
that Krystal continued to insist that Rylee was never left
unattended.26
Additionally, Sergeant Richard Brown, a police officer of the
West Greenwich Police Department, testified that Shane told him
that Shane and Krystal were Rylee’s only caretakers and were the
only people who had access to Rylee.27 Moreover, Brown stated that
Krystal admitted that Shane would stay overnight at Krystal’s
house even though it was a violation of his sex-offender status.28
According to Sergeant Brown, Shane thought Rylee’s injuries were
caused by a spider bite or by the three-year-old child who was
jumping in the bed with Rylee.29
Pamela McLaughlin, a DCYF caseworker, also testified at
trial.30 McLaughlin stated that Rylee “had bonded with her foster
family and had not suffered any broken bones since being removed
from the custody of [r]espondents” and that “she believed it was in
Rylee’s best interest to be adopted by her foster family.”31
Both respondents testified at trial. Shane explained he was
“convicted of first-degree child molestation in 2004 and received a
fifteen-year sentence, with four years to serve.”32 Shane further
testified that, on December 7, 2016, the respondents and Rylee
went to Krystal’s mother’s house and when they arrived, Rylee was
sleeping in her carrier so Shane placed Rylee on a bed, and then left

23. Id. Krystal offered possible explanations for the injuries, including the
carrier, while changing her diaper, the car seat, or even rolling on top of Rylee
while they slept. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. As a result of this investigation, both respondents were arrested
and charged with child cruelty or neglect. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1047.
32. Id.
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the room to have a cigarette.33 Shane testified that, while outside,
he heard crying from the bedroom and found Maddison jumping on
the bed next to Rylee.34 Shane said he “did not see [Maddison] jump
on Rylee” and thought Rylee was crying because she needed a
diaper change.35 Next, Krystal took the stand and testified,
contrary to Sergeant Brown’s testimony, that Shane had never
stayed overnight at her house.36 She also testified that during the
days leading up to the incident, Rylee was “fussy”‘ and Krystal
believed that was due to a growth spurt.37 Krystal further testified
that “Shane did not mention that Maddison had been jumping on
the bed with Rylee until after they had left Hasbro.”38
A licensed psychologist, Joanne Doucette, Ed.D., testified on
behalf of the respondents.39 Doucette claimed that Krystal was no
longer suffering from bipolar disorder and that Krystal told her that
she and Shane went hiking with Rylee on December 7, 2016, and
that, when they arrived home after the hike, they noticed a red
mark that they believed was a spider or tick bite.40 Dr. Doucette
concluded that “neither Krystal nor Shane was at risk for
perpetrating physical child abuse and that Shane was ‘a very low
risk for reoffending as a sex offender.’”41 However, “[t]he Family
Court justice found that respondents ‘were the only people who had
access, care and control of Rylee during the period of time that the
bruises and fractures and injuries were inflicted.’”42
The Family Court justice rejected the argument that Maddison
could have caused Rylee’s injuries because neither of the

33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1048.
39. Id. Dr. Doucette prepared separate reports for each respondent and
testified that she relied on various documents in the creation of the reports.
Id. However, the record was unclear as to which documents were used in preparation of the reports. Id.
40. Id. Dr. Doucette’s report failed to mention that the respondents went
on a hike with Rylee. Id.
41. Id. at 1049.
42. Id. The Family Court issued a comprehensive seventy-two-page decision that reviewed the testimony and exhibits. Id. The decision included
thirty-four findings of facts. Id.
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respondents saw this occur.43 The Family Court justice also found
the respondents’ testimony uncredible and gave “no weight or
consideration to the reports and opinion expressed by Dr. Doucette”
because “her information [was] incomplete, inaccurate, and illogical
based on all of the information presented at trial.”44 However, the
justice gave “great weight” to Dr. Slingsby’s testimony.45 Thus, the
Family Court concluded that DCYF proved by clear and convincing
evidence that the respondents were “unfit by reason of conduct or
conditions seriously determinantal to the child, in that
[respondents] ha[ve] committed or allowed to be committed,
conduct toward [their] child, Rylee [A.] of a cruel and abusive
nature,” and, therefore, it was in the best interest of Rylee to
terminate the respondents’ parental rights.46 The petition to
terminate respondents’ parental rights was granted and the
respondents appealed.47
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

The Supreme Court of Rhode Island “reviews termination of
parental rights rulings by examining the record to establish
whether the Family Court justice’s findings are supported by legal
and competent evidence;” such findings “are entitled to great
weight, and [the Supreme Court] will not disturb them unless they
are clearly wrong or the trial justice overlooked or misconceived
material evidence.”48 On review, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
sought to resolve two issues: (1) whether the Family Court justice
had erred in admitting into evidence the medical report prepared
by Dr. Adewusi; and (2) whether DCYF had proven by clear and
convincing evidence that respondents were unfit parents.
A. Evidentiary Rulings
First, the Court analyzed whether the Family Court erred in
admitting into evidence the medical report that was prepared after

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting In re Violet G., 212 A.3d 160, 166 (R.I. 2019)).
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Rylee was admitted to Hasbro.49 At trial, the respondents objected
to the admission of the medical report on hearsay grounds.50 On
appeal, the Supreme Court rejected this argument and determined
that the medical report was admissible under Rules 803(4) and
803(6) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence.51 The Court reasoned
that “Rule 803(4) provides an exception for statements made for
purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment, including information
about past or present conditions, history, and causation” and “[t]he
proponent of the evidence must lay a proper foundation
establishing that the statements in the record were made for
purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment.”52
The Court noted that when statements are made “merely to
assign fault” they are inadmissible hearsay; however, the Court
found that the medical report “directly pertained to the medical
diagnosis and treatment of Rylee” and therefore was not made
merely to assign fault.53 Moreover, Dr. Slingsby testified at trial
that he had “personal knowledge of all information contained in the
medical report” and the medical report itself stated that Dr.
Slingsby was “in agreement with the above note.”54 Thus, the Court
concluded that the medical report pertained to the diagnosis and
treatment of Rylee and, therefore, qualified under the medicaldiagnosis exception to the rule against hearsay; consequently, the
Family Court justice did not abuse her discretion in admitting the
report.55
B. Termination of Parental Rights
The Court next turned to the issue of whether the Family Court
justice erred in determining that the respondents were unfit
parents. Before a court may terminate parental rights, “the Family
Court justice must find that the parent is unfit”56 A parent is
deemed unfit “by reason of conduct or condition seriously
49. Id. at 1050.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1050 (citing R.I. R. EVID. 803(4); id. cmt.; State v. Watkins, 92
A.3d 172, 188 (R.I. 2014)).
53. Id. at 1050–51 (quoting State v. Veluzat, 578 A.2d 93, 96 (R.I. 1990)).
54. Id. at 1051.
55. See id.
56. Id. (citing In re Violet G., 212 A.3d 160, 166 (R.I. 2019)).
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detrimental to the child;” such conduct includes “[c]onduct toward
any child of a cruel or abusive nature.”57 Further, “[i]f a Family
Court justice determines that a parent is unfit under § 15-7-7, ‘the
best interests of the child outweigh all other considerations’” and
such determination is “entitled to great weight and will not be
disturbed on appeal unless it is clearly wrong or the trial justice
misconceived or overlooked material evidence.”58
Here, the Family Court justice had determined the parents
were unfit, pointing to the evidence that they could not provide any
plausible explanation as to how their daughter obtained her
injuries—the only plausible explanation would be that the
respondents caused the injuries.59 The Supreme Court determined
that the Family Court justice gave great weight to the testimony of
Dr. Slingsby, who testified that Rylee’s injuries were caused by
abuse.60
The respondents argued that there was a lack of clear and
convincing evidence that their conduct toward Rylee was “cruel or
abusive” and further argued that the Family Court justice erred
because “Dr. Adewusi did not testify at trial and therefore was not
subject to cross examination, in violation of their due process
rights.”61 The respondents relied on the Rhode Island Supreme
Court’s decision in In re Adrina T., where the Court vacated a
Family Court decree terminating the parental rights of the
respondent mother due to insufficient evidence that the mother
abused and neglected her child because of conflicting medical
evidence.62 Here however, the Court rejected the respondents’
argument and explained that the respondents’ reliance on the
decision in In re Adrina T. was misplaced.63 The Court noted that
it would “not call into question the reliability or credibility of Dr.
57. Id. at 1051–52 (citing 15 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 15-7-7-(a)(2), 15-7-7(a)(2)(ii)).
58. Id. at 1052 (quoting In re Brian A.T., 146 A.3d 866, 873 (R.I. 2016)).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. (citing In re Adrina T., 162 A.3d 659 (R.I. 2017)). In In re Adrina
T., the Rhode Island Supreme Court reasoned that “there was conflicting medical evidence presented at trial . . . that ‘left it unclear whether Adrina’s injury
was inflicted as a result of abuse or merely accidental in nature.’” Id. at 1053
(quoting In re Adrina T., 162 A.3d at 670).
63. Id.
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Adewusi’s medical testimony; rather, [it] merely acknowledged that
the record contained inconsistencies concerning the medical
testimony presented at trial that were overlooked by the Family
Court justice.”64
The Rhode Island Supreme Court then turned to the
respondents’ argument that the Family Court justice overlooked
material evidence concerning Dr. Slingsby testimony that the
injuries could have occurred at the same time.65 The Court relied
on In re Frances and In re Chester.66 In both cases the Court
affirmed termination of parental rights, holding that it was
reasonable for the trial justice to do so where parents are unable or
unwilling to provide a plausible explanation for their child’s
injuries.67 According to the Court in In re Chester, the “state is not
required to prove which parents actually inflicted the abuse against
the child.”68 Where the evidence is so overwhelming, the trial
justice cannot ignore the reasonable inferences that can be drawn
from the evidence.69
Like in In re Frances and In re Chester, here, there were
reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence to support the
findings of the Family Court justice that there was clear and
convincing evidence of child abuse.70 First, both respondents
acknowledged that they were the sole caregivers of Rylee and never
used a babysitter or left Rylee unsupervised.71 Additionally,
although Dr. Slingsby “acknowledged that Rylee’s injuries ‘could’
have been inflicted at the same time, it was his unequivocal opinion
that the injuries were inflicted by different mechanisms, indicating
that they were not inflicted at the same time or by a single blow.”72

64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See id.
67. Id. (citing In re Chester J., 754 A.2d 772, 776–78 (R.I. 2000); In re
Frances, 505 A.2d 1380, 1384–85 (R.I. 1986)).
68. Id. at 1053–54.
69. Id. (quoting In re Chester J., 754 A.2d at 777–78)).
70. Id. 1054.
71. Id.
72. Id. Doctor Slingsby’s testimony was given “with the requisite degree
of positiveness” and such expert testimony “is admissible and issues relative
to the weight of the evidence are left to the fact-finder.” Id. (quoting Riley v.
Stone, 900 A.2d 1087, 1092 (R.I. 2002)).
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The Court also reasoned that the respondents were untruthful
about certain facts at various times.73 Moreover, the respondents
failed to tell anyone about the possibility of Maddison jumping on
Rylee.74 Krystal argued that the Family Court justice “overlooked
or misconceived the video of her interview with police” and that the
video shows that Krystal was “cooperative and consumed with grief,
horror, and yearning to be reunited with her child.”75 Although it
was unclear what weight the Family Court justice gave the video,
the Court noted that the justice had access to the video and
referenced it in her opinion and, in any event, determined that the
probative value of the video held no reversible error considering the
fact that the Family Court justice observed Krystal testify at trial.76
The Rhode Island Supreme Court determined that the Family
Court justice’s findings were sufficiently supported by clear and
convincing evidence.77
COMMENTARY

The Court affirmed the Family Court justice’s decision to
terminate the parental rights of Rylee’s biological parents, Krystal
and Shane, in order to protect Rylee’s well-being.78 The Rhode
Island Supreme Court consistently stressed that a parent’s right
should be terminated if the parent is deemed unfit and if such
termination would be in the best interest of the child. There is no
single objective rule in determining when parental rights should be
terminated, and, therefore, the Court has closely examined the
facts in each case.
Moreover, the Court recognized the importance of the medical
diagnosis or treatment exception to the rule against hearsay in
child abuse cases. The respondents alleged that Dr. Adewusi’s
medical report was hearsay and, therefore, inadmissible under
Rhode Island Rules of Evidence Rule 801(c).79 The Court applied
the hearsay exception created to admit statements made for
73. Id. For example, whether Shane spent the night at Krystal’s house
and whether he took Rylee to Dunkin’ Donuts alone. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1054–55.
78. Id. at 1055.
79. Id. 1050; see R.I. R. EVID. 801.
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purposes of medical diagnoses or treatment which includes
statements about the cause of the injuries.80
Here, the medical statements, although hearsay, fell into the
medical diagnosis exception because the report was made in
response to Rylee’s medical treatment. As the Court noted, “the
rationale behind the medical-diagnostic exception is that ‘a person
will presumably be truthful to a physical from whom he expects to
receive medical attention.’”81 Having the knowledge of the cause of
Rylee’s injuries is pertinent to a medical diagnosis and treatment
plan needed to fully assess Rylee’s injuries. Generally, statements
of fault are inadmissible hearsay under the medical diagnostic
exception. But, in scenarios like this, courts are routinely more
lenient in admitting evidence of hearsay when dealing with child
abuse for public policy reasons. If courts were not lenient in this
regard, many cases of child abuse or neglect would go unpunished
because there would be less evidence of such behavior.
Throughout the Court’s opinion, substantial weight is placed
on the best interest of the child. Both Rhode Island statutes and
previous Rhode Island Supreme Court decisions have continuously
found that the best interest of a child outweigh all other
considerations. Here, the respondents’ failure to proffer a plausible
explanation of Rylee’s injuries and the inconsistencies in their
statements to various officials, coupled with the various medical
testimonies and records, the Family Court justice had clear and
convincing evidence that remaining in the care of the respondents
was not in Rylee’s best interest.
Lastly, the Court was mindful of the “significance of severing
the bond between parent and child.”82 However, the Court also
noted that it is in “the best interest of children to have a safe and
nurturing environment in which to live, learn and grow.”83 Here,
it was in Rylee’s best interest to terminate the respondents’
parental rights. As Pamela McLaughlin noted in her testimony,
Rylee had not suffered any injuries since being placed with her
foster family and had bonded with them.84 Because Rylee was

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

In re Rylee A., 233 A.3d at 1051.
Id. at 1050 (citing State v. Pina, 455 A.2d 313, 315 (R.I. 1983)).
Id. at 1055 (quoting In re Alexis L., 972 A.2d 159, 170 (R.I. 2009)).
Id. (citing In re Alexis L., 972 A.2d at 170).
Id. at 1047.
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thriving in her new home, it made sense that returning Rylee to an
environment of abuse would not be in her best interest. Thus, the
Court terminated the respondents’ parental rights.
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court determined that the Family
Court justice’s findings were based on clear and convincing
evidence and were not clearly wrong. The Court noted that it will
generally not disturb the findings of a lower court “unless they are
clearly wrong, or the trial justice overlooked or misconceived
material evidence.”85 Therefore, the Family Court’s judgment to
terminate the respondents’ parental rights to their daughter, Rylee,
was affirmed.86
Alyssa M. Knappins

85. Id. at 1049 (quoting In re Violet G., 212 A.3d 160, 166 (R.I. 2019)).
86. Id. at 1055.

